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ute.Y It is submitted that the court could have relied soley upon the
principle expressed in its opinion of giving "the strictest construction
to such statutes as authorize the fiscal court to expend funds raised
by taxation!'." without using the technical device of ejusdem generis.
R. VINCENT GooDLzTT.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-RIGHT OF THE HUSBAND TO SUE FOR
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
D negligently operated his motor trailer, striking the automobile
in which P's wife was riding and injuring her. The wife in a prior
suit had recovered damages for her own personal injuries. P now
sues for loss of consortium. A husband has such a right to his wife's
services, society and companionship that he may maintain an action
for their Impairment or loss resulting from a third person's negligent
act and such a right is not affected by statutes relating to married
women, nor by the fact that compensation may have been awarded
the wife for her personal injuries. Commercial Carriers,Inc. v. SmailU
The reasoning of the Kentucky court, in line with the weight of
authority, is that there are two separate and distinct injuries: one to
the wife for her personal pain and suffering, and another to the husband for the loss or impairment of his wife's service and society.
These are two independent injuries for which damages may be
recovered in separate actions. 2 Dean Pound points out that as a result
of our method of trial and assessment of damages by jury, if each
were allowed to sue Instead of each recovering an exact reparation,
each would be reasonably sure to recover what would repair the
Injury to both.8 Yet is it more likely to occur here than in other
cases?' The fact is that in many cases because of an injury to one
spouse there is an unmistakable injury to the other. In the principal
case the husband was forced to withdraw from the active social life
he and his wife had enjoyed. They could no longer attend church
together, his conjugal relations were impaired, his former companion
became emotionally unbalanced, a neurotic. This constitutes a real
injury to the husband, one for which he alone is entitled to damages.
Certainly no undesirable result is reached In allowing the husband to
sue in such a case.
The rule Is criticised in a few jurisdictions on the ground that the
action of consortium at common law was based on the husband's
XTJefferson County v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 274 Ky. 91,
118 S. W. (2d) 181 (1938).
2Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Jefferson County, 278 Ky. 68,
70, 128 S. W. (2d) 230, 231 (1939).
1277 Ky.189, 126 S. W. (2d) 143 (1939).
2
Annotation (1923) 21 A. L. IH.1517.
8Pound, Individual Interest in Domestic Relations, (1915) 4 Mich.
L. Rev. 177, 194.
4Holbrook,
The Change in Meaning of Consortium, (1933) 22 Mich.
L. Rev. 1, 8. It would seem that if this be a valid criticism it is
directed at the entire method of trial by jury under instruction of the
court and should not be directed at this particular action.

CASE COMMENTS
right to the wife's services.5 The wife was socially and legally regarded
as inferior to her husband, having her existence merged with that of
his, and owing to him the duty of serving and administering to him in
all the relations of domestic life
It is argued that in view of present
public opinion as to the equality of the sexes, and the Married Women's
Acts,' there are now only conjugal relations, society and companionship which the husband acquires by virtue of the marital union. These
the law has never undertaken to measure pecuniarily.' Thus, a few
courts say, the action by the husband for loss of consortium is without basis and should be denied.' However, by the weight of authority,
these obligations are not intangible but are substantial and vital factors
in producing and sustaining the union, and the husband is entitled
to compensation in money for their loss51
The most valid criticism made of the rule in the principal case
is not in regard to allowing the action by the husband but rather the
denial of a similar action by the wife for personal injury to the husband." The principal reason given by the courts for the limitation is
that the action was denied at common law.? But at common law any
recovery by either spouse would go to the husband, since he was
entitled to all his wife's personal property.'3 Therefore, if the wife
were allowed to sue in her own name for a resulting loss of consortium, it would amount to the husband's recovering twice for the
same injury, because he also had a right of action for his own bodily
injuries. A second reason given is that since the wife has no right to
r, Marri v. Stamford St. Ry. Co., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582 (1911).
0 Ibid.
'Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1936) sec. 2128.
'Marri v. Stamford St. Ry. Co., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582, 585 (1911);
"An enumeration of the multitude of cases in which recovery by the
husband for loss of consortium resulting from personal injuries has
been approved, and especially the earlier and better considered of them,
discloses that the loss of service and the capacity for service resulting
from diminished or destroyed ability to serve in useful ways has been
the real basis of recovery. Search for a case of that character in which
it has been held either directly or by reasonable implication that a
husband could recover for the simple reason that conjugal affections,
society, or companionship had been rendered less agreeable or satisfactory to the husband by reason of an injury to his wife will, we
think, bear small fruit." Cooley, Torts (third ed. 1906) 471; Lippman,
Breakdown of Consortium, (1930) 30 Col. L. Rev. 651, 653.
'Marri v. Stamford, 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582 (1911); Gearing v.
Beckson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N. E. 786 (1916).
1OAnnotation (1923) 21 A. L. R. 1517; Commercial Carriers v.
Small, 277 Ky. 189, 126 S. W. (2d) 143, 146 (1939): "In this state, the
right of the husband to maintain an action of this kind is not affected
by modern statutes relating to married women, nor by the fact that
compensation may have been made the wife for her personal injuries.
...
We recognize that the so-called sentimental elements of consortium are vital factors in producing and sustaining the union with
respect to the husband, including his right to receive the wife's services
about the household and her assistance in the care of the children."
nAnnotation (1920) 5 A. L. R. 1049; (1921) 13 A. L. R. 1333.
Holbrook, supra n. 4.
"Madden, Domestic Relations (1931) 152.
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the services of her husband, upon which the action of consortium is
based, she has therefore not been injured.14 But it may be argued that
in realty the procedural impediment" was the reason for the lack of
common law authority on this point, and that therefore a right did
exist at common law and now the Married Women's Acts (removing
that impediment) empower her to assert her right. 6 Under the modern
view of marital relations there are mutual rights and obligations
between the spouses. It is well settled in practically every jurisdiction
that a wife has an action for loss of consortium as a result of an intentional invasion of the marital relations." Why is it not allowed in
negligent invasions? It is argued that here it is remote and inconsequential." But precedent establishes that such damages are not
remote for the husband; then why are they remote for the wife, who
possesses the same rights and owes the same obligations as the husband? Only one court has allowed this action by the wife."9 This
court considered the various reasons which have persuaded other courts
to deny such a right to the wife and held that they no longer existed
because of the Married Women's Acts, or that they were not valid.
The case, while standing alone, seems to represent reason and logic.
As Holbrook said, "It is' difficult to avoid the conclusion reached by the
North Carolina court."
But notwithstanding this failure of the courts in not allowing
the action of consortium by the wife in the case of an unintentional
injury to the husband the law of Kentucky, in accord with the weight
of authority, is that of the instant case. A husband has such a right
to his wife's services, society and companionship that he may maintain an action for their impairment resulting from a third person's
negligent or wrongful act, and such a right has not been affected by
statutes relating to married women, nor by the fact that compensation
may have been awarded the wife for her personal injuries."
HARnY ROSERTS
"13 BI. Comm. 142, "The wife can not recover damages for beating
her husband, for she hath no separate interest in anything during her
coverture. Notice is taken only of the wrong done to the superior of
the parties related."
-5Madden, supra n. 12, 156.
" Holbrook, supra n. 4, 3.
3"Turner
v. Heavrin, 182 Ky. 65, 206 S. W. 23 (1918); Geromini v.
Brunelle, 214 Mass. 492, 102 N. E. 67 (1913); Brown v. Brown, 124
N. C. 19, 32 S. E. 320 (1899).
1MMcGelee, Wife, Separate Action for Personal Injury to Husband,
(1922) 1 N. C. L. Rev. 34, 35 as cited (1924) 3 N. C. L. Rev. 101.
"Hipp v. Dupont, 182 N. C. 9, 108 S. E. 318 (1921); see Justice
Scudder's dissent in Landwehr v. Barbos, 270 N. Y. S. 534 (1934).
wIbid.
Holbrook, supra n. 4, 8.
"Restatement, Torts (1938) sec. 693; "One who by reason of his
tortious conduct is liable to a married woman for illness or any other
bodily harm is subject to liability to her husband for the resulting
loss of her services and society, including any impairment of her
capacity for sexual intercourse, and for any reasonable expense incurred
by him in providing medical treatment."

